Plan Colombia comes in for a lot of flak from the left as being a militaristic adventure on the part of the DEA, and it’s certainly had its problems. But I recently got a rather involved comment on it from someone involved in some of its more successful, nonviolent, actions. Read on for some very well-reasoned opinions (which may or may not reflect those of any government agency or associated company and are not an official statement of any sort) about policy, economic development, and more. I’ll follow up later with links on guerillas, terrorism, drugs, and alternative development in Colombia and the world at large.
While I agree that Plan Colombia has not been completely successful in
accomplishing all of its objectives, I do see some progress being made
as a result of the program’s efforts and the glimmers of hope for
movement toward peace and economic growth. Point by point:
Supply and demand: I think it is correct that Plan Colombia’s efforts
are likely to have little or no impact on the availability of
cocaine and heroin in the US. Successful eradication by means of
fumigation in one area of the country will cause production to move to
another part of the country or part of the world with limited
government presence and similar conditions of instability. It is
interesting to note that the significant decline in heroin poppy
production in Colombia in the past year was not the result of
eradication efforts (the poppy cultivations are for the most part much
smaller and harder to detect and therefore difficult to target via
aerial eradication) but by a drop in the price of Heroin caused by
preferences shifting toward synthetic drugs and a bumper harvest in
Afghanistan. Similarly, demand for cocaine is decreasing as consumer
preferences shift to synthetics.
What you do see as a result of eradication (both voluntary and by
fumigation) is an increased presence of the state in areas of the
country that had previously been neglected and a concerted effort to
expand alternative economic opportunities. While the vast majority of
funds under Plan Colombia have gone to military operations and
fumigation, significant funds have been spent on alternative
development. Alternative development is not crop substitution. It is
an integrated effort to improve governance and economic opportunities.
Eradication is a politically necessary indicator for the program, but
not necessarily the only or final objective. In Putumayo, which until
this past year was the number one coca producing region in Colombia,
close to 100,000 hectares of coca were eradicated, 14% by voluntary
eradication under the USAID Colombia Alternative Development (CAD)
project.
Recent verification studies carried out by the project have confirmed
this eradication and its sustainability (provided the GOC and USAID
follow through on proposed alternative development activities).
During the verification, farmers who participated in the program were
polled on their reasons for participating in the program. As may be
expected the most frequent response was to avoid fumigation (which
could destroy both their licit and illicit crops). However, this
response accounted for only 33% of the total. The other two thirds of
the responses focused on seeking a better opportunity for their
families, reducing the violence in their communities, and generally
seeking a better way of life.
The CAD project has as its two primary indicators the hectares
voluntarily eradicated and hectares of licit crops established.
However, other results of the project include construction or
rehabilitation of schools, roads, bridges, health centers, community
centers, and rural electrification. Economic opportunity projects
focus on developing higher value-added products, secondary processing,
and linkages with markets. These activities to not translate into a
one-for-one substitution for illicit crops, but are nonetheless
necessary for the success and sustainability of the program.
Similarly, USAID designed a program to support small and medium
enterprise growth in order to generate employment in urban areas
closely associated with illicit crop production. This program falls
under the banner of alternative development and is funded through Plan
Colombia, but is not a simple crop substitution program nor is it
ramming the US Government’s drug policy down the throats of peasants.
Rather, it is a recognition of the need to address the problems that
are at the root of Colombia’s drug problem and civil unrest.
Increased violence: I am not a hawk by any stretch of the imagination,
but I believe that Uribe’s hard-line tactics have made great strides
in terms of improving the stability in the country. His approach has
naturally increased violence in some areas, but this is in part a
result of having to undo the problems created under the Pastrana
administration’s appeasement policy. By effectively ceding a large
part of the country to the guerillas, he allowed them to benefit from
the huge profits of the drug trade and to become one of the best
funded guerilla armies in the world. Uribe has used the military to
open up roads between the major cities and to restore government
control in outlying parts of the country. His recent decision to
temporarily move the seat of government to Arauca, while a symbolic
gesture, was an important indicator of the government’s commitment to
all parts of the country.
The drug war and terrorism: Failed states are the breeding grounds for
terrorism, as we’ve seein in Afghanistan. It is therefore in our
national security interest to promote stability and a strong Colombian
state. Journalists’ arguments that the “tri-border area of Brazil,
Argentina and Paraguay” is “far from Colombia” seem to be a cop-out
from having to face a legitimate point. The similar conditions of
economic, political, and geographic isolation that allow terrorist
groups to fester are present in Afghanistan, the tri-border area, and
in rural Colombia. Moreover, arrests in the past year of Latin
American drugs and drug money being used to purchase arms in Asia (a
big bust in Texas disrupted a drugs for arms shipment and one in
California disrupted a drugs for arms transaction with arms supposedly
destined for an Islamic extremist group) demonstrate the links of the
drug trade to international terrorism.
Conclusion: I agree with the general argument that more effort needs
to be devoted to economic development and governance, and less
emphasis put on military solutions. However, I fear that writers and,
worse, policy makers, may include successful alternative development
efforts in their broad attacks against Plan Colombia, crippling the
kind of long-term progress they most wish for.
Secretly Ironic 